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THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIORITY
Douglas G. Bairdt
INTRODUMION
American judges have long asserted that a portion of the assets of
an insolvent finn should always be made available for its general credi-
tors.1 A secured creditor should not be able to enjoy all the assets,
even if the secured creditor made the loan when the firm was solvent,
properly recorded the interest, and otherwise cut square corners.
General creditors can include tort victims, small trade creditors, and
unpaid (and now unemployed) workers. After the fact, their claims
have a greater moral force than those of a large, diversified financial
institution. In recent years, these arguments have gained strength at
the same time legal scholars have come to appreciate the difficulty of
explaining the benefits of secured credit. That both should happen at
the same time should come as no surprise. The less convincing the
defense of the secured creditor's priority right, the easier it becomes
to argue that it should be cut back.
In this Article, I identify some of the issues on which this ongoing
debate is likely to focus. The first part of the Article suggests that
changes in priority rights are unlikely to bring significant benefits or
impose substantial costs. One must, of course, be cautious. The bene-
fits of priority rights are indirect. They may affect the ability of entre-
preneurs to find investors, but we cannot identify particular firms that
never came into being as a result of a particular change in priority
rights. It remains much easier to see the individual worker who is
unpaid than those who would have received ajob, but did not because
an entrepreneur could not find the investors needed to start the firm.
Nevertheless, it is worth understanding what follows if the stakes in-
volved are small. Among other things, noninstrumentalist justifica-
t Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor and Dean, University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Early cases combine concerns about leaving assets available for general creditors
with concerns about notice. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). Later
cases identified keeping some assets available for general creditors as a distinct issue. See,
e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 359-61 (1925); Zartman v. First Natl Bank of Water-
loo, 82 N.E. 127 (N.Y. 1907). One of the drafters of Article 9 later came to hold this view.
See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions
ofa Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 627 (1981).
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dons for limiting the priority accorded to secured creditors become
important.
Squarely confronting noninstrumentalist justifications, however,
underscores their basic weakness. They are not attractive to those
who want legal rules to work social change. It is one thing to protect a
worker after the fact in the context of a particular case, but quite an-
other to assert that such a rule makes workers as a group-or indeed
anyone else-better off. The same forces that render the priority ac-
corded to secured creditors relatively unimportant may dramatically
limit the extent to which a change in priority rules can help those we
want to protect. For instance, if a lender buys a machine and then
leases it to the firm instead of taking a security interest in it, the
change in the priority rule may have only a small effect on the inves-
tor,2 but the response of the investor may undercut the value of the
change to the intended beneficiary. The unpaid worker has priority,
but the firm has fewer assets. The lesson here is that protecting work-
ers or anyone who cannot protect themselves is much harder than
merely changing priority rules.
The third part of this Article focuses explicitly on involuntary
claims against the firm. Even if the stakes are small, changing priori-
ties in this context may make sense. When investors in a firm can
remove assets before tort victims, the firm does not adequately ac-
count for the harm its actions do to others. Limiting the priority of
secured creditors may provide them with a set of incentives that re-
dound to the benefit of potential tort victims. The most significant
challenge, I suggest, may be to understand how our analysis of the
priority question is connected with the broader discussion of corpo-
rate tort liability.
The last part of this Article looks at an issue that scholars have
largely neglected. One of the most important issues in corporate fi-
nance is the cost of restructuring firms that encounter financial dis-
tress. A full analysis of priority rights among creditors ought to take
into account how different legal regimes affect the cost of a corporate
reorganization. There are a number of reasons to think that these
costs may be large enough to make them centrally important.
2 The effect turns on how burdensome it is to bear the incidents of ownership that
characterize a true lessor, rather than a secured creditor. For a discussion of this issue
below, see infra Part I.
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I
THE STAKES IN THE PRIORITY PUZZLE
The bedrock of modem corporate finance is the Modigliani and
Miller indifference proposition.3 It establishes that, in perfect capital
markets, a firm's capital structure has no effect on its value. By in-
creasing its debt, a firm makes its cost of equity cheaper, but at the
same time raises its cost of debt by an equal and offsetting amount.4
The indifference proposition makes it hard to identify the benefits
that flow from allowing some creditors to enjoy priorities over others.
The harder it is to identify the benefits of secured credit, the easier it
is to justify putting limits on it.
Reasonable people take opposite sides of the debate about
whether net benefits flow from allowing a creditor to enjoy a priority
in all the assets of a firm. From this fact alone, we might infer that the
magnitude of either the benefits or costs may be quite small. Chang-
ing the secured creditor's priority right leaves unaffected many other
rights that are of comparable value. By taking a security interest in a
piece of equipment, a creditor sharply checks the ability of a debtor to
sell it to someone else and squander the proceeds. Once the debtor
grants the security interest, the debtor no longer can give someone
else clean titie. Limiting the secured creditor's priority right does
nothing to undercut this power-a power to curtail mischief that re-
dounds to everyone's benefit. Moreover, limiting the priority right
leaves unaffected a creditor's ability to obtain subordination agree-
ments. Indeed, one can understand limits on a priority right as
3 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capita Corporation Finance and
the Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958); see also Merton H. Miller, The Modi-
gliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 99. The power and
the broad acceptance of these propositions is hard to overstate. Put-call parity and option
pricing theory derive from these irrelevance propositions. They are empirically tested
(and vindicated) every day in options markets. Phenomena such as program trading sim-
ply would not exist if these propositions were wrong.
4 See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143, 1147-61 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Ren M. Stulz
& HerbJohnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14J. FIN. ECON. 501 (1985). The parts of these
articles most often discussed are those that suggest possible ways in which secured financ-
ing may bring net benefits to a firm. Their importance, however, lies in identifying why
making the case for secured credit is difficult and why conventional justifications are want-
ing. For a recent explanation of why the benefits of secured credit are elusive, see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 880-903 (1996). Traditional law review scholarship has been quite slow
in recognizing the difficulties in showing net benefits from secured credit. Arguments
against the Modigliani-Miller indifference propositions that have long since disappeared
from the economic literature retain respectability in law reviews. See, e.g., Homer Kripke,
Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 929 (1985).
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merely changing a default rule. If there are large gains to be had
from priority, they can still be had even if priority rights are abolished
altogether, provided only that transaction costs are sufficiently low.
A large firm may have only a few different categories of
debtholders. In these cases, arranging for the contractual subordina-
tion of one group of creditors relative to another may not be signifi-
cantly harder than having different tiers of security interests.5 Small
firms typically have only one institutional lender.6 The institutional
lender in these cases often finds that its biggest risk is that the firm
will hemorrhage cash as it fails. Unless these payments can be recov-
ered as voidable preferences, the priority right makes little differ-
ence.7 The effect of limiting the institutional lender's ability to
enforce its security interest in this context may be to accelerate the
declaration of default or other event that precipitates a
reorganization.
It is also worth noting that the priority among creditors in the
event of default is only one way in which creditors sort themselves.
Equally as important are the term of the debt and the sequence in
which the obligations are paid off. In some leveraged buyouts during
the late 1980s, for example, the different branches of debt had the
same collateral and the same priority, but longer payout structures
(and an interest premium of 75 to 125 basis points to compensate for
the higher risk).8 Limits on the priority rights of secured creditors
could affect lending terms along any number of dimensions, such as
duration, reporting, and conditions of default. This ability to adjust
along other dimensions mitigates the harm that might flow from re-
stricting the ability of a firm to create priorities among its creditors.
The consistent finding of empirical studies of capital structures is
that these structures vary widely, even inside the same industry.9 Pri-
ority rights are irrelevant if a firm has an all-equity capital structure; in
fact, almost one-third of all firms with five hundred or fewer employ-
ees have no institutional debt.10 But this does not mean that capital
5 Indeed, the use of subordination agreements might expand considerably if priority
rights of secured creditors were limited. Much like large institutional lenders that do not
insist on priority, firms that use standard forms when dealing with trade creditors and
workers might add subordination clauses. There is no reason to think that these clauses
would be less enforceable than any other clause in the standard contract. In fact, bank-
ruptcy law traditionally respects such clauses to the extent that they are effective under
nonbankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1994).
6 See Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships:
Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. FIN. 3, 10 (1994).
7 Even if one can find out where the cash went, certain safe harbor rules may protect
trade creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2) (1994).
8 SeeJay R. Allen, LBOs-The Evolution of Financial Structures and Strategies, J. APPUIED
CoRP. Fin., Winter 1996, at 18, 20.
9 See Petersen & Rajan, supra note 6, at 7-8.
10 See id.
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structure is irrelevant. It may be that the way in which firms operate,
and the way they are monitored, turns on who their creditors are. If
businesses can flourish with different capital structures, then it would
seem that limiting the availability of one capital structure should not
produce great costs.
Even if priority rights were important, investors could still enjoy
them by entering transactions that, although not within the scope of
the law governing secured transactions, give them the same priority
rights. The single greatest challenge confronting the abolition or the
scaling back of secured credit is distinguishing between secured trans-
actions and other transactions that have almost the same economic
effect.
The close similarities between the conditional sale and the lease
are well known.1" In general terms, the central difference lies in the
reversionary interest that the true lessor holds after a lease. 12 A true
lessor holds risks of ownership that a secured creditor does not. The
burden of ownership may be too small to prevent conditional sellers
from becoming lessors, if the alternative were a significant reduction
in their priority rights: Moreover, markets evolve and change in re-
sponse to changes in legal rules. It is not altogether implausible that a
lender could engage in a true lease with its debtor and then convey its
reversionary interest to someone well-equipped to bear the risk of
ownership. Indeed, a debtor that wanted to buy a machine and fi-
nance it through a security interest might instead lease a machine
from one person and buy a reversion in an identical machine from
someone else.
The issue does not end with leases.1 3 Can limits on a secured
creditor's priority rights apply to possessory interests? What about
trust receipts or field warehousing? What happens to the purchase of
notes, chattel paper, and accounts receivable? Sharply limiting the
ability of debtors to sell accounts is necessary in any system in which
we want to effectively limit the priority rights of lenders who take ac-
counts as collateral.' 4
Even if these limits could apply to accounts, a debtor might with
little effort have customers, whose purchases they finance, execute
documents that meet the criteria for negotiable instruments. Effec-
tively limiting creditor priority in accounts might require wholesale
changes in the rules of negotiability. The stakes involved in a debate
11 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4, at 926-29.
12 This oversimplification captures the basic spirit of what is a multi-factored test. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) (defining a security interest).
13 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 61-63 (1996).
14 The decision of the drafters of Article 9 to treat the two transactions identically
underscores this point. See U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1994).
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over the scope of a secured creditor's priority right are necessarily
small if we remain unwilling to alter certain aspects of our legal re-
gime (such as the rules governing negotiable instruments) that have
nothing to do with secured credit.15 Even if all these transactions
could be limited, firms might find an intermediary who extended
credit to the firm's customers and then in turn paid the firm some
discounted, amount. Though the intermediary has never extended
credit to the firm, it stands in the same position that it would have
occupied if it had bought the accounts. Such intermediaries are
merely the commercial equivalents of credit card issuers. One can
also expect lenders to take advantage of the ability of a firm to sort
separate activities into different corporate shells. An unsecured
lender to a subsidiary corporation is in the same position vis-A±-vis the
creditors of the parent corporation as a secured lender of the parent.
To close this avenue of replicating the rights of a secured creditor,
one would again have to make radical changes in regimes that are
ordinarily seen as unrelated to Article 9.
Benedict v. Ratner'6 is the case most often cited in support of the
idea that the rights of secured creditors should be cut back. In Bene-
dict, Justice Brandeis held that a lender could not enjoy a priority in
the firm's accounts because the lender allowed the firm to exert too
much control over them. 17 The case, however, is perhaps better seen
as an example of how lenders can adjust to changes in legal rules.
Benedict's effect on secured lending may not have been so much to
limit priority rights in accounts, but rather to alter how it was done
and by whom. In the years following the case, taking security interests
in accounts became more common, and lenders who specialized in
asset-based financing flourished.'8 While amateurs lost their way, pro-
fessional lenders quickly learned how to navigate such terrain.
Grant Gilmore defended Benedict v. Ratner on the ground that it
gave the account financers an incentive to monitor their debtors,
something that redounded to everyone's benefit.19 In other words, in
Gilmore's view, the case did not in fact change the secured creditors'
priority rights as much as it changed the behavior of the secured cred-
itors in a way that was beneficial. The lesson of the case may be not
.that -limitations on priority rights are good or bad, but rather that we
must be mindful of the many ways in which creditors respond to such
limits.
15 We may, of course, overrate the value of negotiability. SeeJames Steven Rogers, The
Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REv. 265 (1990). Nevertheless, it may be a battle that we do
not want to pursue merely because of nonadjusting creditors.
16 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
17 Id. at 360.
18 See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 622.
19 Id. at 626-27.
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II
NONINSTRUMENTALIST LIMrrs ON PIORIT
We routinely assess legal rules by the way they change behavior.
Imposing tort liability on negligent drivers induces people to drive
more carefully. Contract law facilitates trade because people perform
knowing that they can sue if the other side breaches. Laws matter,
however, even apart from the way they affect behavior before the fact.
Deterrence is not the sole justification for our criminal laws. Regard-
less of whether anyone is deterred, we do not want to live in a commu-
nity whose norms tolerate rape or murder. Noninstrumentalist
justifications are less often put forward in debates about commercial
law, but they may have a role to play here as well.
Let us posit the legal rule we should have for, say, a steel maker
that has failed and is liquidating in Chapter 7. Suppose the steel
maker's assets are not even enough to satisfy the most senior bond-
holders, all of which are large financial institutions. Also suppose that
the firm promised medical benefits to its retirees. Although the retir-
ees are likely to suffer from many diseases associated with years of
work in the mills, the promises made to them have the status of un-
secured claims. One can argue that the retirees should receive some-
thing in the liquidation, quite apart from whether the retirees could
have contracted for priority over the bondholders before the fact: the
retirees ought to receive something so they can leave the courthouse
with their dignity intact, believing that the legal system respects the
promises they were made and in reliance on which they devoted a
major part of their lives. Although the large financial institutions
leave with less, they should be able to anticipate this result. Given
their diversified portfolios, their loss should have virtually no effect on
their profits even over a short period of time.
Making the noninstrumentalist argument allows us to end the dis-
cussion at this point. The focus is exclusively on the parties who ap-
pear before the court. To the noninstrumentalist, the way in which
the actual litigants are treated is the only issue. Many of us, however,
are unlikely to stop here. We also want to know how granting this
right affects retirees whose firm does not liquidate in Chapter 7. This
is the instrumentalist question, and here the story becomes more
complicated.
We bargain in the shadow of the law. The rights of retirees of
failed firms outside of bankruptcy might be stronger if the retirees are
granted priority inside. The power to force the firm into Chapter 7
empowers the retirees, but this does not end the inquiry.
Most of those who would choose to respect the rights of the retir-
ees on noninstrumentalist grounds in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding would also want to ensure that they were treated well
1426 [Vol. 82:1420
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIORITY
outside of bankruptcy. Doing this, however, requires much more than
adopting a rule that changes the priority of secured creditors in bank-
ruptcy. The law, for example, could require that any promises made
to retirees be fully funded. Or it could go further, requiring that the
firm both make these promises and set aside resources to ensure that
these promises would be kept even if the firm failed.
We cannot adopt a rule giving the retirees priority over secured
creditors and, without further inquiry, believe that we are improving
the lot of retirees as a general matter. Distributional rules in bank-
ruptcy are at best an incomplete solution to larger issues of public
policy. A legislator might favor such a rule if she lacks the votes for a
broader solution, but if her goal is to protect retirees across the board,
she would have to worry that such partial solutions might do more
harm than good.20 She would, for example, have to take into account
the possibility that a priority would reduce the number of retirees to
whom promises were made in the first place.
The point here is by no means a new one. Too often, bankruptcy
scholars assert that matters of public policy in bankruptcy involve only
balancing the interests of a particular group (such as workers) against
the interests of creditors.21 This Manichean approach is wrong. Most
obviously, it dramatically overstates the normative claims of the credi-
tors. The creditors in question are almost invariably those who, in the
terminology of Bebchuk and Fried, are "perfectly adjusting."22 Own-
ers of capital have access to global financial markets. These competi-
tive markets ensure that, when owners of capital hold a diversified
portfolio, they will have, in expectation, the same risk-adjusted return
regardless of where they invest. Viewed prospectively, changes in se-
cured credit regimes may affect how much these owners of capital
choose to invest in particular business enterprises, but they will not
affect the return owners of capital receive from any investment. They
can take priority rights into account by varying the interest rate and
other terms and conditions of the loan.23 Thus, if we focus exclusively
on the balance between the interests of creditors and those of some-
20 Congress passed the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act in 1988, but its
effects are even more limited than the rule discussed in the text. Retiree Benefits Protec-
tion Act of 1988, 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). It protects retiree health benefits only to a
limited extent, and only in the case of firms in Chapter 11 that successfully reorganized.
See id. § 1114(e)-(/. Retirees of firms that fail to reorganize successfully or that fail
outside of Chapter 11 are unprotected. See generally Retiree Health Benefits: The Fair-Weather
Promise, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong. (1986) (discussing the
appropriate congressional response to the LTV bankruptcy).
21 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CMI. L. REv. 775, 775-97 (1987).
22 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4, at 881-82.
23 Even if owners of capital fail to take priority rights into account, there is no reason
to think that legislators can fashion rules to protect them or that, as a normative matter,
they should focus their energy trying.
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one else, these other interests should always win. Casting the issue as
a matter of balance is coherent only if one's approach is exclusively ex
post and noninstrumental.
The policy questions that arise from an instrumentalist approach
to priority rights must involve an assessment of all the benefits and
costs, both direct and indirect. Those whose interests need to be
taken into account are everyone (except creditors) whom a business
enterprise affects. The trade-offs that need to be made are often not
between different groups, but between different costs and benefits
within the same group. This is analogous to the minimum wage, which
provides a direct benefit to those workers whose wage it increases, but
an indirect cost to those who remain unemployed because the law has
reduced the number of jobs that are available. No one denies that
such a trade-off must be made, but people differ as to the relative
importance of the two effects. The same sort of calculus lies at the
heart of public policy in bankruptcy. When we ask whether to give
retirees a priority in bankruptcy when promised health benefits, we
have to consider if the grant of the priority will affect whether such
promises are made in the first place. We have to ask whether we want
to increase the value of the promise for a smaller number of retirees.
This may or may not be an easy question, but it has nothing to do with
protecting the rights of creditors.
This need to focus upon such trade-offs is now central to studies
of regulation.24 Scholars are now cautious about analyzing regulation
as if the central issue were one of balancing dollars against health and
safety. Now we realize increasingly that casting the question in this
form made things too easy. When we consider banning a substance
that may be carcinogenic, we have to ask whether people will trm to a
product that, while not carcinogenic, brings with it a high risk of heart
disease.2 5 If we delay the widespread introduction of a drug to the
market, we may ensure that it is safe, but at the same time people who
might benefit from it must wait.26 How we strike the balance may vary
from case to case; an AIDS drug is different from a new tranquilizer.
It is not a question of dollars versus lives, but how we make trade-offs
within groups that need the protection of the law.
So too in bankruptcy; taking the moral high ground is not as easy
as assuming that the question is one of weighing the rights of creditors
against others. We must take account of indirect costs and benefits
that are hard to see and that cut across a wide range of issues. Chang-
ing priority rights affects retirees, trade creditors, workers, utilities,
and every other kind of general creditor, as well as consumers and
24 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 298-317 (1997).
25 See id. at 301.
26 See id.
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everyone else in the community who is affected by whether a firm
comes into being and whether it survives. As long as our approach is
in part instrumentalist, we have to confront these issues. If we care
about shaping our bankruptcy laws to make our society a better place,
we cannot simply assert that one regime of priority rights is more at-
tractive than another.
When we alter priorities in bankruptcy in an effort to effect
broader change, we can be most confident about what we are doing
when we think that the change in priority itself will have a salutary
effect on the way people behave. Because this is most likely to happen
in the case of involuntary claims against the firm, it is that problem to
which I now turn.
III
INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS AND INVESTOR LIABIL
Scholars have long noted that firms can shift the risk of insol-
vency onto tort victims and other involuntary creditors by granting
their creditors security interests.27 A firm is more likely to engage in a
hazardous activity if any of its investors, including secured creditors,
can prime tort victims. As long as investors can enjoy the benefits
when a firm engages in a hazardous activity, but avoid some of the
costs, a firm will not fully account for the harm it causes to others.
This point, of course, has long been recognized, and it applies to
all investors, not just secured creditors.28 Even if there were no secur-
ity interests at all, we would have the same debate about whether tort
victims should have to share bankruptcy proceeds with general credi-
tors. If tort victims came before general creditors, general creditors
would have a greater incentive to ensure that the firm took precau-
tions than they would if they shared with them pani passu. Limited
liability itself creates the same problem: by doing business in limited
liability form, investors undervalue the harms the business venture im-
poses on the rest of the world.
This problem might be solved without any change to the law gov-
erning secured credit. Some scholars, for example, have proposed
that firms be required to insure against tort liability.2 9 Alternatively,
we could allow involuntary creditors to pierce the corporate veil3 0 or
27 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 33-34; Christopher M.E. Painter, Note, Tort Credi-
tor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1045,
1046 (1984).
28 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRucruRE OF
CORPORAT LAW 52-62 (1991).
29 See, e.g., S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 54-55
(1986).
30 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraaknan, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1931-32 (1991).
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sue the managers of the firm.3' To the extent that any of these de-
vices proves effective, adjusting the priority of secured creditors is
moot.3 2 Examining the rights of involuntary creditors and secured
creditors in the context of the larger debate matters for a second and
much more important reason: it may not even be possible to have a
legal regime that forces firms to internalize all their costs and, at the
same time, distinguishes among the rights of different investors in a
firm.
Modem finance theory shows that, in well-developed capital mar-
kets, one can transform any investment contract into another through
the purchase of options and other kinds of derivative instruments. 33
In a world in which secured credit and equity are simply slightly differ-
ent flavors of investment contracts, it may be hard to create legal re-
gimes that allow tort creditors to reach one type of investor (such as
shareholders), but not others (such as secured creditors) .34 Without a
coherent theory of investor liability and a set of laws to match, corpo-
rate tort liability may disappear.3 5 Once we make the case that equi-
tyholders should be liable to involuntary creditors, we may not be able
to reach their assets unless we extend the net of liability to include
secured creditors. In a world of put-call parity and global financial
markets, distinctions among different kinds of investors tend to van-
ish. The problem is already manifest in corporate taxation.36
Let us assume, however, that we can effectively separate the rights
and obligations of secured creditors from those of other investors. To
understand the priority right secured creditors should enjoy, we need
to isolate the ways in which changes in the legal regime governing
secured credit raise discrete problems. Let us assume, for example,
that secured creditors are well positioned to ensure that a firm takes
proper precautions when it engages in activities that might harm
others, and that this burden is small relative to the cost of gaining
priority through vehicles that are not themselves secured transactions.
31 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 61-62.
32 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 4, at 883.
33 See Note, Investor Liability: Financial Innovations in the Regulatory State and the Coming
Revolution in Corporate Law, 107 HARv. L. Ruv. 1941, 1942-45 (1994).
34 Stephen Choi has made this point most forcefully. See id. at 1955-58.
35 See id. Lynn LoPucki has taken this argument one step further and has suggested
that by creating bankruptcy-remote entities, leasing physical assets, and selling accounts
receivable, a legal regime that focuses merely on investors cannot be effective. LoPucki,
supra note 13, at 54-61.
36 See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARv. L. REv. 460, 460-61 (1993).
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In this case, as many have suggested, the most appropriate course is to
allow tort victims to prime secured creditors.3 7
This approach dominates an across-the-board reduction of the se-
cured creditor's priority right. Such a reduction is, among other
things, massively under- and over-inclusive. Most insolvent firms do
not have significant uninsured tort claims against them. In cases in
which the tort claims are massive, general changes in priority rights
distribute assets not only to tort victims, but also to creditors who may
have been as lax as the secured creditor, and might themselves have
done something to prevent the harm.
IV
PRioRry RIGHTS AND THE COSTS OF CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
It is commonplace that a restructuring of a firm involves a sale.
When a firm is liquidated piecemeal, individual assets are sold. Firms
in economic distress, like firms that are prospering, can be sold out-
right to other firms. Workouts and restructurings inside Chapter 11
may involve actual sales of some or all of the firm's assets. Likewise,
the creation of a new capital structure is itself best understood as a
hypothetical sale in which creditors exchange their old claims against
the firm for new ones.38
In assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chapter 11,
we have long compared the Chapter 11 mechanism with alternative
forms of selling the firm, such as mandatory auctions or the issuance
of option rights to different classes of investors. 39 The central issue in
this debate has been the relative costs of the different forms of sale.
Defenders of Chapter 11 can point to recent empirical work that sug-
gests that, for large firms, the cost of Chapter 11 reorganization is
small relative to the costs of other types of sales.40 They can also ex-
tend the argument by pointing out that the most obvious alternatives
to Chapter 11, all of which are market-based, seem likely to work best
for large firms, for which robust markets can most easily develop. If
37 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 826 (1994);
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 1565,
1646-49 (1991).
38 See Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YAL L.J. 1238,
1250-54 (1981).
39 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 523, 526-32 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15
J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 136-45 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 101 HAuv. L. REv. 775, 781-97 (1988); MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New
Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 597-600 (1983).
40 See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution-Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27J. FIN. ECON. 285, 288-90 (1990).
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Chapter 11 works well in the case of large firm reorganizations, one
might argue that it should work even better for small firms.
Any discussion of a substantial change in the treatment of se-
cured creditors should connect itself to the literature that examines
the costs of Chapter 11 reorganization and other procedures for re-
capitalizing a firm in economic distress. The cost of selling an asset
can range from a fraction of 1% to almost 20% of the asset's value.41
For a very small fee, a share of stock can be sold through a discount
broker. A real estate broker might earn a 5% commission for selling a
house. By contrast, an auctioneer's commission at a sale of fine art or
the fees associated with an initial public offering are at the other end
of the spectrum. Typically, the costs of bankruptcy under current law
are less than 5% of asset value for large firms, but are sometimes sig-
nificantly larger for smaller firms. 42 In some cases the costs can ap-
proach the value of the firm.
Each regime of secured credit brings with it different costs in a
reorganization. These costs are, of course, incurred only in those in-
stances in which the firm fails and needs to be reorganized. The pri-
ority right of the secured creditor, however, only matters because of
the possibility that the firm will become financially distressed. The
expected costs of a reorganization rise and fall with the importance of
the priority right. The history of corporate reorganizations may iden-
tify a risk associated with changing priority rights. 43
Railroads, the first large modern corporations, were financed al-
most entirely with secured credit. The only general creditors were
trade creditors, and they were such a small part of the picture that in
many cases they were paid off in full as a matter of routine. The cen-
tral issue in the late nineteenth century was not weighing the rights of
secured and unsecured creditors, but rather sorting out the rights of
the many different kinds of secured creditors.
The reorganization of the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad
is a representative case.44 It had grown through mergers and expan-
sion into a giant with an unwieldy capital structure. Its rails connected
the American Southwest with the West Coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and
Chicago. By 1888, the system had 7010 miles of track, almost half of
what existed in Britain at the time. The corporation had forty-one
41 See Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy: Theoretical
Analysis and Practical Guidance 9-13 (Mar. 27, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
42 See Weiss, supra note 40, at 289.
43 For a history of the railroad reorganizations of the 1890s, see STuART DAGrrr,
RAILROAD REORGANIZATION (1908).
44 See id. at 192-219.
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classes of bonds and an outstanding indebtedness of $164 million. 45
The secured creditors faced two problems. First, there was no easy
way to assess the value of any creditor's claim. A security interest in
ten miles of track between nowhere and nowhere had no value apart
from the railroad as a whole. But each secured creditor was entitled
to some portion of the value of the entire road.
Second, there was no easy means of determining how much a
particular class of secured creditor should receive. Moreover, many of
the creditors were in England or in other parts of Europe. They had
many reasons not to trust the insiders who were running the firm, but
no way to displace them. Intermediaries emerged who had the exper-
tise to understand these large transactions, the reputational capital to
gain the trust of the investors, and the genius to understand how the
firm's capital should be restructured. These intermediaries were
among the most gifted bankers and lawyers of the day, and their firms
flourish even today.46 They saw that the simpler the capital structure,
the better. The Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe eventually emerged
with only one issue of preferred stock, one issue of common stock,
and two classes of bonds.47 The new capital structure proved sound,
and the railroad thrived in subsequent years.48 The principal on the
last of the bonds issued in the second reorganization in 1895 was paid
in full in October 1995.49
The reorganization of the Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe, like so
many others, teaches us that simplicity is the single most important
virtue of the law of corporate reorganizations. We should remember
it as we contemplate limiting the priority right of secured creditors, a
change that necessarily increases both the number of people with
claims to a firm's assets and the complexity of their claims. Limiting
the priority right directly affects the costs of a reorganization. For ex-
ample, limiting the priority right of secured creditors creates a pool of
assets-of unencumbered assets to be sure-but under current law
these assets go first not to the general creditors, but rather to the pool
used to pay administrative claims. 50 In other words, limiting priority
45 See id. at 198. Revenues were $28 million and operating expenses were $22 million.
See id, Net earnings were insufficient to pay fixed interest costs and were expected to re-
main so. See id. at 199.
46 Among the more prominent figures were Paul Cravath and J.P. Morgan. For a
personal account of these professionals' involvement, see 1 ROBERT T. SWAIN, THE CRAVATH
FIRm AND rrs PREDECESSORS 502-10 (1946). For a more general account of the thought and
practice of the leading academic and practicing lawyers of the day, see Robert W. Gordon,
Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
47 See DACGETr, supra note 43, at 211.
48 See id. at 216.
49 See Floyd Norris, After 114 Years, It's Payday, N.Y. TiMES, July 1, 1995, at 33.
50 See 11 U.S.G. § 507(a) (1994).
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rights immediately increases the assets available to pay lawyers and
other professionals. It is possible that as this pool increases, fees and
other expenses will rise correspondingly.
Although fees in the larger cases are, on average, quite small rela-
tive to the value of the firm's assets as a whole, 51 they can consume the
unencumbered assets of a closely held firm.52 It is not hard to find
instances in which the Chapter 11 case ends as soon as the assets avail-
able to pay the lawyers dry up.53 It could be that insufficient resources
are now being spent reorganizing firms, and that too many firms now
fail to reorganize successfully because there are insufficient assets to
pay the costs of administering the bankruptcy. But whether this effect
on reorganizations is good or bad, it is an issue that should be front
and center in any analysis of how we might change priority rights.
The dynamics of Chapter 11 are likely to change in other ways as
priority rights change. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362, for example, a secured
creditor is sometimes allowed to lift the automatic stay and retrieve its
collateral when the debtor has no equity in the collateral.5 4 Limits on
priority, by their nature, ensure that the debtor always has equity in
the collateral. Hence, the primary means by which the secured credi-
tor now brings a Chapter 11 case to an early end necessarily disap-
pears if priority rights are limited and nothing else changes.
The benefit of Chapter 11 turns on the willingness of investors to
take advantage of it. Investors who want to avoid Chapter 11 are able
to do so under current law through a variety of different devices. The
less costly these devices relative to Chapter 11, the more apt creditors
will be to use them, and thus, the benefits that Chapter 11 brings will
be lost.
The basic virtue of the equity receivership was its creation of a
simple way in which a firm could be recapitalized. New investment
instruments could be substituted for the old ones. Information could
be gathered, and investors could hold securities in the new entity,
confident that they had clean title to the firm's underlying assets. Pri-
ority rights may serve much the same purpose. Article 9 makes it pos-
sible for firms with many different kinds of personal property to create
a simple capital structure with only a few classes of investors.
51 See Weiss, supra note 40, at 289; Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Liquidation and Reor-
ganization, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE 35-1, 35-32 tbl.35.4 (Dennis E. Logue ed.,
1984) (stating that costs of a representative sample of all firms that successfully reorganize
are only 3% of the amounts paid to creditors under the reorganization plan).
52 For a case that shows these dynamics at work, see In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc.,
107 B.R. 909, 942 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
53 Eastern Airlines is perhaps the most notorious example. See Claudia MacLachlan,
Blame J3ys in Demise of Airline, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1991, at 1, 35-36.
54 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2) (1994).
1434 [Vol. 82:1420
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROITY
When a firm needs to be reorganized, investors as a group may
care much more that one can easily determine who owns which assets,
than that the assets are distributed in a particular way. Indeed, one
may be able to make a broader claim: all else being equal, one would
prefer legal regimes that pushed firms to have simpler capital struc-
tures. Changing priority rights may push firms in the opposite direc-
tion. A corporate reorganization is about bargaining. Its ambition
should be to keep this bargaining as simple and inexpensive as possi-
ble. We must be cautious about legal rules that increase the number
of people at the bargaining table.
CONCLUSION
Before Article 9 was drafted, firms could encumber virtually all of
their personal property. Creditors had to use arcane devices such as
field warehousing or the trust receipt, but it could be done. After a
century of seeing how investors created these interests notwithstand-
ing the many legal obstacles put in their path, Article 9 was in some
sense a surrender to the inevitable. If investors are going to create
security interests anyway, legal rules might as well reduce the costs
they encounter in doing so.
Whenever an economy is going through dramatic change concur-
rently with massive technological and regulatory change, it is hard to
find one's bearings. Although the capital of many firms has a neat,
hierarchial structure on its balance sheet, looks are deceiving. Even
the simplest firms have many stakeholders, ranging from the landlord
who has modified the premises, to suppliers who build custom parts,
to workers who have invested firm-specific human capital in the enter-
prise. The industries most in flux have the most complicated struc-
tures. The network of contracts that binds health-care providers to
one another is only one conspicuous example; a look at any high tech-
nology firm will provide others. When these firms fail, as some will,
our law of corporate reorganizations will be the means by which we try
to put them back on track. How easily and cheaply we can do this may
depend upon the rules governing priorities among creditors.
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